Toyota part 1: Where it all went wrong

Public safety 10 Comments
(Image provided by Mytho88 via Wikipedia)

(Image provided by Mytho88 via Wikipedia)

Just a year or two ago, Toyota was a model case study in business management.

Recognised as a leader for quality, safety and reliability, and modeled by rivals for its ‘lean production’ system, the Japanese giant was arguably the most respected car maker in the world.

Nowadays, the company still features in case studies – but for all the wrong reasons.

In this series, I would like to look at what exactly went wrong.  In the next post, I will talk about what lay behind the company’s poor response to the crisis.

 
Where did it all go wrong?
Problems associated with unintended acceleration are well documented, as is Toyota’s sluggish and poor response.

But to attribute the current crisis to any one singular cause is over-simplistic. More likely, a combination of contributing factors was at play:

 
• Expanding too fast.

Back in 2002, the company set a goal to expand its global market share from 11% to 15% (refer article).

Sensible and manageable though that may sound, commentators such as James Womack, one of the authors of “The Machine that Changed the World”, a prominent book about Toyota’s innovations in manufacturing, believe that this almost certainly contributed to current problems.

For one thing, management focus became consumed with the relentless push for growth, causing traditional considerations such as safety and customer satisfaction to take a back seat.

In addition, a by-product of this was a massive expansion within Toyota’s supply chain, with the company being forced to place increasing reliance on newer suppliers outside of Japan. Reports suggest that unlike traditional Japanese suppliers, who share an intimate working relationship with the automaker, many of these new suppliers were not familiar with Toyota’s methods, nor was expansion of the supply chain itself matched by sufficient effort to integrate new suppliers into the production process or to ensure that quality control was not compromised in the process.

 
• Complexity.

Coupled with growth came increasing complexity, both of the cars themselves and of Toyotas rapidly expanding production system.

As the Taiwan News puts it:

“In an average Toyota, there are about 24,000 inputs and outputs, with as many as 70 computer chips processing information and sending it on to other chips to operate the engine control units. It is a very complex system.”

Added to this are the company’s sprawling global operations – it now has more than 50 plants outside Japan and more models on the road than any other carmaker (same article). To manage all of this effectively would require an almost superhuman effort. The associated complexity almost certainly contributed toward current problems.

 
• Focus on the parts, but forgetting the whole

Another contributing factor, believes Kenichi Ohmae from The Christian Science Monitor, relates to the company’s excessive focus on minute detail and a loss of the bigger picture in terms of the overall workings of the engine as a whole.

A large aspect of the world renowned Toyota Production System (TPS) revolves around the Japanese concept of Kaizen, which focuses on continuous improvement in the manufacturing process. These improvements, in turn, tend to be smaller and incremental, and to stem from a bottom-up type of focus upon individual aspects of the production process.

Whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with this concept as such, problems arise where it is taken to extremes and management loses focus on the bigger picture of the vehicle as a system and how all of the parts work together as a whole.

 
• Cultural issues.

Cultural issues no doubt played a part as well, as did management style.

As I understand it, Japanese culture is characterised by strict hierarchies and an emphasis on maintaining group harmony at all costs. Questioning a senior is virtually taboo, as is causing a senior to ‘lose face.’ In this environment, lower level workers are expected to tow the line and problems at an operational level are rarely reported to senior management.

Combine this with a management style which was said to be highly centralised and largely disengaged from operations on the factory floor, and one could understand the scope for serious problems to go undetected.

 
Conclusion
It is likely that Toyota’s current problems stem not from a singular cause but from a combination of contributory factors.

10 Responses to “Toyota part 1: Where it all went wrong”

  1. Brad Shorr Says:
    March 21st, 2010 at 9:33 pm

    Andrew, thank you for sharing your research and insight. As a loyal Toyota customer for many years, I’ve been rather mystified at how this deterioration occurred. I look forward to reading more. One positive – for those, and there are many, who continue to have confidence in the brand, there has never been a better time to buy a Toyota or Lexus.

  2. Andrew Heaton Says:
    March 22nd, 2010 at 7:19 am

    Brad,

    Yep, I can’t imagine that the company would be exactly short stocked at the moment.

    That said, they do still continue to enjoy a strong (though slightly dinted) reputation, built over an eighty year history of excellence.

  3. Mark Says:
    March 24th, 2010 at 10:50 pm

    Andrew,
    This is a good start to what I expect will be a great article. Sounds like the foundation was built to create an environment where these types of mistakes would be made and it would be a surprise if these mistake were not made under the conditions Toyota created.

  4. Andrew Heaton Says:
    March 25th, 2010 at 5:46 am

    Thanks Mark,

    Though I think Toyota’s system is fairly strong, I would say that the foundation was not built to handle such a rapid expansion.

  5. Candy Ottley Says:
    April 17th, 2010 at 3:34 pm

    Hello Andrew, thanks for the article about Toyota and particularly about the role of culture. As, you said the culture within the factory is hierachial and structured and that is fine but, once the supply chain included other cultures the company couldn’t control all the processes needed to produce the car to their standards. The problem with this type of top-down management is that it often doesn’t see anything is wrong.
    When the company had to communicate with cross-cultural suppliers they probably were still operating within a hierachial power relationship rather than adopting a sharing of power. Candy

  6. Andrew Heaton Says:
    April 20th, 2010 at 8:10 am

    Hi Candy,

    Thanks for stopping by. It was a pleasure to meet you last week.

    Your comments sum up the situation pretty well. There’s nothing inherently wrong with the way they operate, but it does seem that they were not adequately prepared to handle growth of the magnitude they were experiencing and the consequential expansion of the supply chain.

  7. Good Honest Dollar $$ » Blog Archive » Toyota Part 2: Behind the poor response Says:
    April 20th, 2010 at 4:51 pm

    [...] a recent discussion, I highlighted some of the underlying factors which contributed to the recent debacle surrounding [...]

  8. Candy Ottley Says:
    September 13th, 2010 at 11:02 am

    Hi Andrew

    I have been contact by the Doncaster Librarian and the Melbourne Weekly Eastern want to interview us and take a group photo for newspaper. Are you interested in being interviewed and being part of the group photo?

    Candy Ottley

  9. Ronnie Says:
    September 21st, 2010 at 8:03 pm

    I would say that QUALITY needs to be a closed loop. The issue with using external suppliers is how to specify exactly the requirements and how to ensure them. In other words, if you negotiate for a plastic accelerator linkage how do you specify the temperature range, wear, lubrications, rigidity, accuracy, sensitivity, break-point, resistance (to misuse, corrosion, impact, etc), tolerance, longevity, cost, deterioration, servicability, replacability, aesthetics, etc, etc.
    Nice to take an internal (e.g. Toyota) “specification” but without the “continuous improvement” and “work ethic” of Toyota Corp, mainly all the Supplier has as incentive is to “produce” to “specification” a quantity at a price. In my view, this is where it all breaks down. Not “Cultural”. I have seen it in several other Corporations. A more workable idea is “Parnterships” rather than outsourcing or Supplier relationships, but in my view these are yet to mature enough to be better than in-house, IF one wants the best quality (and therefore customer value proposition).

  10. drew Says:
    September 22nd, 2010 at 6:34 pm

    Ronnie,

    Welcome to my blog.

    Thanks for your detailed and thoughtful response – you obviously know your stuff about cars. I could certainly see how outsourcing to external suppliers might result in complications from the viewpoint of specifying precise requirements. I can also see how external suppliers may have an incentive to produce only to the specifications required as opposed to necessarily delivering the best quality parts.

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